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Federal arrangements are often used as a way of keeping deeply divided societies together. In particular,
where divisions, be they ethnic, linguistic, or religious, develop in violent conflict or the threat of civil
war, constitutional arrangements for self-rule and shared rule have been put forward as a key to peace.
The federal distribution of power is then used to satisfy sectoral demands for self-determination.
1. his article examines how federal arrangements were used during South
Africa's transition to democracy to deal with the conflict posed by two
important ethnic-based groupings: right-wing Afrikaners and Zulu
nationalists. It will be argued that while limited federal arrangements were
successful in containing the conflict, this aspect of South Africa's federal
enterprise quickly faltered when the underlying conflicts and federal
impetus dissipated. This case study, then, provides an interesting illustration
of the dynamic quality of federalism; it can be a flexible political process
that responds to the exigencies of the moment.1
FEDERALISM IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
After peace was brokered between the white minority regime, led by the
National Party (NP), and the African National Congress (ANC) first, in the
unbanning of the ANC on 2 February 1990, and thereafter in the cessation
of hostilities in June 1991, federalism was an important but not the dominant
issue in the constitutional negotiations between the two parties.2
The ANC saw federalism simply as a method of thwarting majority rule,
particularly when it came from the National Party, which, after years of
extremely centralized rule, became recent converts to the idea of establishing
AUTHORS' NOTE: This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the meeting of the International
Association of Centers for Federal Studies, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Israel, 19-22 October
1998.
'See, in particular, Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism and the Way to Peace (Kingston: Institute of
Intergovernmental Relations, 1994).
2See generally Nico Steytler, "South Africa," Federalism and Civil Society, eds. Jutta Kramer and Hans-
Peter Schneider (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), pp. 297-298.
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regional autonomy.3 Creating strong federal units would be a method of
legitimating apartheid's homelands and the creating of a separate white
Volkstaat. The ANC favored a strong central-state authority in order to effect
the fundamental restructuring of the South African society.
From the NP's perspective, decentralization was not necessarily linked
to the protection of territorially based ethnic interests because, except for
the provinces of the Western Cape and Northern Cape where non-Africans
(whites and coloreds) were in the majority, its white support-base was
dispersed across the country. Rather, decentralization was seen as a brake
on a strong central government. For the NP, the national government
remained the locus of power, and power-sharing had to take place at that
level. At the first round of negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa (Codesa), and subsequently at the Multi-Party Negotiating
Forum, the key area of contention between these two parties was the control
of the power to be wielded by the national executive. The breakthrough in
negotiations was not the agreement on the creation of provinces and the
limited devolution of power to these subnational units, but the creation of
a government of national unity. The NP thus placed its faith primarily in
shared rule (literally through the device of a government of national unity),
rather than self-rule.
When the final political deal was made on 2 December 1993 at Kempton
Park, principally between the ANC and the NP, and which was later given
legal form by the tricameral Parliament as the interim Constitution,4 two
important groupings, both ethnically based—right wing Afrikaners and
nationalist Zulus-were absent. They were vehemently opposed to the
dispensation, and a conflict of major proportions loomed as the election
date of 27 April 1994 came nearer. Both groups thought they had the
capacity to scupper the holding of the election by violent means.
Conflict During the Transition Period
When the ANC and the NP agreed in July 1993 upon a date for the
election at the Multi-Party Negotiating Council, a number of important
players walked out of the negotiating process. They included the Inkatha
Freedom Party (IFP) under the leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi,
the Conservative Party (CP), the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF) headed by
General Constant Viljoen, and the governments of the homelands of the
Ciskei and Bophuthatswana. These groupings, in turn, later formed a loose
alliance called the Freedom Alliance. In the main, their demands included
the finalization of the constitution before the election date was set, and the
establishment of a constitutional federal democracy.5 In the case of the
'See David Welsh, "Federalism and the Divided Society: A South African Perspective," Evaluating Federal
Systems, ed. Bertus de Villiers (Cape Town: Juta, 1994), p. 244.
"Act 200 of 1993.
5Willem De Klerk, "The Process of Political Negotiations: 1990-1993," Birth of a Constitution, ed. Bertus
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white right-wing, the goal was racial federalism in the form of an Afrikaner
Volkstaat, while the other clamored for ethnic federalism. The IFP, in
particular, was in favor of extensive provincial autonomy. The IFP sought
enhanced legislative and financial powers as well as the entrenchment of
provincial governance. To the latter end, the IFP insisted on a separate
ballot for the provincial legislatures and also a name change for the province
of Natal to KwaZulu-Natal.6 A more contentious issue was the position of
the Zulu monarch. In this regard, the demand was that the Zulu king be
constitutionally recognized and the monarchy's position and status
entrenched.
The withdrawal of the IFP from the Multi-Party Negotiating Council was
unexpected because the opportunity for advocating stronger regional
powers was not exhausted. One theory advanced is that the form of state
and regional powers was not Buthelezi's chief concern. Rather, he had
been outraged at the failure of the ANC and the NP to see him as one of
the three equal partners.7
The interim Constitution was adopted by the Multi-Party Negotiating
Council on 2 December and included the creation of a Constitutional
Assembly that would write a final constitution within two years on the basis
of agreed upon Constitutional Principles. It was denounced by the IFP and
the AVF. They would also not participate in the election scheduled for 27
April 1994, after which the interim Constitution would come into operation.
The ANC and the NP were, however, still willing to offer concessions in
return for their participation in the election.
An important underlying dimension to the demands of the Freedom
Alliance was the potential for violent conflict.8 The AVF spoke of civil war
while the IFP referred to secession. These possibilities had to be evaluated
in the context of the endemic violence which had ravaged the country since
the unbanning of the liberation movements. One aspect of the violent
conflict was the open warfare in KwaZulu-Natal and on the Reef between
supporters of the ANC and the IFP. Although there were differing reasons
advanced for this national bloodletting, the perception was that the IFP
had to be considered a serious player in the political arena even if it was
only for the fact that it had the ability to destabilize any political process,
including the elections.
The white right-wing, comprising the Afrikaner Volksfront, the
Conservative Party, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, and, most important,
retired generals from the armed forces, not only had formidable power,
but also the loyalty of serving members of the armed forces, the vast majority
"Hansard, Wednesday, 22 December 1993, col. 16211.
7Doreen Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle? The Multiparty Negotiating Forum," South African Review 7:
The Small Miracle-South Africa's Negotiated Settlement, eds. S. Friedman and D. Atkinson (Johannesburg:
Raven Press, 1994), p. 32.
'See Malyn Newitt and Mervyn Bennun, "Conclusion," Negotiating Justice: A new Constitution for South
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of whom would identify themselves as Afrikaners. The problem in this regard
was not necessarily the loyalty of each individual member but more that of
the top echelons who masterminded the war against the liberation
movements during the previous decades. It was suspected that the right
wing was well represented in those quarters and, furthermore, that those
elements had a hand in the perpetuation of the violence ravaging the
country.
Inevitably, the continued bloodletting had a negative effect on public
confidence in the peace process. Although the violence never seriously
influenced the process, the need for peace became the benchmark against
which the negotiation process was judged.9 It soon became clear that an
inclusive election was the only viable option to a successful transition to
democracy.
Constitutional Amendments to the Interim Constitution
The first step toward inclusion was the amendments to the 1993
Constitution effected in March 1994.10 While negotiations between the ANC
and the NP and the Freedom Alliance continued outside formal structures,
the ANC and the NP decided on a "highly visible" attempt to meet the
demands of the latter." Without brokering a deal with those parties for
their participation in the election, the ANC and the NP agreed upon
constitutional amendments desired by the Freedom Alliance. The main
parties to the Alliance, the CP and the IFP, were, however, represented in
the tricameral Parliament where they continued to voice their opposition
against what they considered to be the limited extent of the proposed
amendments.12
The amendments of March 1994 sought to meet the divergent federal
demands. In respect of IFP demands, the following constitutional
amendments were made. First, the name "Natal" was substituted with that
of "KwaZulu-Natal." Second, regional powers were enhanced. Laws passed
by the provincial legislatures would in general prevail over laws passed by
the national Parliament on matters reserved for the provinces. Third,
greater fiscal and financial autonomy were provided for by enhancing the
taxing competence of the provinces. Fourth, greater powers were given to
provinces in the drawing up of their provincial constitutions by creating
room for asymmetrical constitutions. Fifth, voters would be able to vote
separately for national and provincial governments. Sixth, an amendment
to Constitutional Principle XVIII provided that the powers and functions
of the provinces could not be diminished substantially in the final
Constitution.
9Mark Shaw, "The Bloody Backdrop," South African R£view 7: the Small Miracle-South Africa's Negotiated
Settlement, eds. Friedman and Atkinson, p . 182.
"Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 2 of 1994.
"Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle? The Multiparty Negotiating Forum," p. 37.
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For the white right-wing, extensive provisions were made for giving effect
to the promise of self-determination in a Volhstaat. A Volkstaat Council was
included in the Constitution for the purpose of conducting further
negotiations on the subject of a Volkstaat. In this respect, a further
Constitutional Principle was added providing for self-determination of a
community sharing a common culture or language. Constitutional Principle
XXXIV read as follows:
l.This schedule and the recognition of the right of the South
African people as a whole to self-determination, shall not be
construed as precluding, within the framework of the said right,
constitutional provision for a notion of the right to self-
determination by any community sharing a common or cultural
heritage, whether in a territorial entity within the Republic or
in any other recognised way.
2.The Constitution may give expression to any particular form of
self-determination provided there is substantial proven support
within the community concerned for such a form of self-
determination.
3.1f a territorial entity referred to in paragraph 1 is established in
terms of this Constitution before the new constitutional text is
adopted, the new Constitution shall entrench the continuation
of such territorial entity, including its powers, structures and
functions.
The CP nevertheless objected to this as inadequate provision for the
establishment of a Volkstaat. They were seeking their own territory,
constitution, and government. They wanted a guarantee prior to the
election that they would receive their own state.13
As the deadline for the registration of political parties for participation
in the election approached (a date that was moved back by the constitutional
amendments of March 1994), General Viljoen broke ranks with the AVF
and registered a party, the Freedom Front, which declared its intention to
contest the elections. The constitutional carrot of a Volkstaat was thus
successful in attracting significant white right-wing support.
The IFP stayed out, and the violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal and on the
Reef escalated, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency
in KwaZulu-Natal. Two weeks before the election date, the ANC and NP
agreed to the IFP demand for international mediation. When that failed,
an agreement for reconciliation and peace between the IFP/KwaZulu
government, the ANC, and the NP/South African government was reached
on 19 April 1994. In terms thereof, the IFP undertook to participate in the
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elections, and all parties committed themselves, among others things, to
reject violence and to do everything possible to ensure free and fair elections.
The parties also agreed to recognize and protect the institution, status, and
role of the constitutional position of the Zulu King (which would require
an amendment to the Constitution before the elections) and, if necessary,
to refer outstanding matters in respect of the Zulu monarch and the
Constitution to international mediation immediately after the elections.14
The constitutional amendments of 25 April 199415-enacted a mere two
days before the election-were minor in law but enormous in symbolism.
First, in an extension of the amendment passed in March, provinces could
provide in their provincial constitutions, at their discretion and where
applicable, for the institution, role, authority, and status of any traditional
monarch in the province concerned. This provision was, however,
mandatory in the case of the constitution for the province of KwaZulu-
Natal. Second, Constitutional Principle XIII was amended to entrench the
provisions in any provincial constitution relating to the institution, role,
authority and status of a traditional monarch when the new Constitution
was eventually adopted.
In light of these minimal concessions, there is much speculation as to
why Buthelezi decided to join the process. He did not win any significant
provincial powers, but received what he had already been offered before.16
The Zulu monarch, King Zwelithini, may have been decisive in changing
Buthelezi's mind. There was little love lost between them, and the transfer
of tribal land by the South African government to the King a day before the
election, may have swayed Buthelezi. Without royal support and facing the
prospect of an uncertain future outside government office, there may have
been little option left for him. With the IFP joining the fold, the small
miracle of a peaceful democratic election was almost complete. The only
violence came from white right-wing extremists who carried out a limited
bombing campaign in the run-up to the election.
The election itself ushered in the final phase of peacemaking. The
election in KwaZulu-Natal, marred by irregularities, produced what some
observers called a "negotiated" result.17 The IFP was given a one-seat
majority in the KwaZulu-Natal legislature, a result which the ANC decided
not to contest in court. This political approach to the conflict with the IFP
set the tone for how the ANC, as election victor, would deal with the IFP
and Buthelezi in the future.
"Hansard, 25 April 1994, col. 16724.
nConstitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 3 of 1994.
16Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle? The Multiparty Negotiating Forum," p. 39.
I7Steven Friedman and Louise Slack, "The Magic Moment: The 1994 Election," South African Review 7:










niversity user on 02 M
ay 2019
Federal Arrangements as a Peacemaking Device 99
THE 1996 CONSTITUTION
After the election, the Freedom Front and the IFP sought to exploit the
federal promise embedded in the interim Constitution. Both were chasing
mirages.
The Volkstaat Council was convened and commenced with the search for
a homeland. In its submission to the Constitutional Assembly, the Volkstaat
Council had to concede that there was no geographical territory in which
Afrikaners were in the majority. The goal of self-determination was, then,
deferred to the distant future. At the same time, the threat of a right-wing
insurrection evaporated as the new ANC government slowly but surely
secured its grip on the levers of power in the armed forces.
The KwaZulu-Natal legislature commenced with the drafting of a full-
fledged federal provincial constitution, which was totally at odds with the
letter and spirit of the interim Constitution. Inevitably, this constitution
was rejected by the Constitutional Court. It refused to certify that the
constitution was in accordance with the interim Constitution because the
provincial legislature sought to give itself more powers than the interim
Constitution had conferred upon it.18
The IFP withdrew in March 1995 from the Constitutional Assembly
(Parliament sitting as the constitution writing body) barely two months after
it had commenced work. The reason advanced was that the IFP's demand
for international mediation had not been met. On the table they left their
constitutional proposals, drafted by their American advisor, Mario
Ambrosini. These posited a fully fledged federal constitution like that of
the United States. While remaining a party to the government of national
unity widi three cabinet posts (one occupied by Buthelezi), the IFP engaged
in another round of brinkmanship. At the same time, the key demand of
the IFP, for the Zulu King to be the monarch of the province for KwaZulu-
Natal, did not came to fruition. The ANC effected a breach between King
Zwelithini and Buthelezi with the result that there was litde political demand
for the king's installation as provincial monarch.
When the final Constitution reached completion in May 1996, a different
reality pertained to that of two years before. Although violence remained
endemic in KwaZulu-Natal, there was little need for specific deals. There
was a clear shift away from the interim Constitution's asymmetrical federal
features placating specific constituencies, to symmetrical but watered down
federal elements.
Self-Determination in the 1996 Constitution
Bound by the Constitutional Principles, the final Constitution had to
reflect the notion of self-determination. Constitutional Principle XXXIV
was thus effectively repeated in section 235:
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The right of South African people as a whole to self-determination, as
manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework
of this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination
of any community sharing common cultural and language heritage, within
a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by
national legislation.
Capturing the Constitutional Principle in a section reduced a powerful
principle into a meek non-operative provision. The right to self-
determination, in the legal sense, was reduced to, at most, a political claim.
Any federating process along the route of self-determination would not be
in the hands of any self-selected community, but will be governed by
Parliament itself.
The Volkstaat Council lost its constitutional protection. As a sop to the
Freedom Front,19 a new commission was created-the Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic
Communities. Its primary objects are:
(a) to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and
linguistic communities;
(b)to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity,
tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and
linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-
discrimination and free association; and
(c) to recommend the establishment or recognition, in
accordance with national legislation, of a cultural or other
council or councils for a community or communities in South
Africa.20
The mismatch between the commission and operationalizing the notion
of self-determination is obvious. First, firmly wedged in between the cultural
and linguistic communities is a new community, the religious. With religion
not being territorially, culturally, or linguistically based, but cutting across
such cleavages, the focus of the commission is dispersed. Second, while the
commission must promote respect for cultural, religious, and linguistic
rights, which in any event are protected in the Bill of Rights,21 and which
bind all organs of government,22 the focus is on the second object-to seek
harmony between the listed groups within a unitary state. Rather than
seeking separateness, the commission must pursue "friendship," "tolerance,"
19See Anthony Johnson, Cape Times, 21 August 1998.
^Section 185(1) Constitution.
"Section 31 reads: "(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be
denied the right, with other members of that community-
fa) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; and
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil
society. (2)The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision
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and "national unity." The rationale for the commission would thus undercut
the notion of separateness on which the Volkstaat idea is premised. As a
possible consolation prize to the Volkstaat Council, the new commission
could, in a way prescribed by Parliament, recommend the recognition of a
cultural or other council. This could include the Volkstaat Council.
The certification process of the final Constitution before the
Constitutional Court provided the final opportunity for parties to affect
the contours of that Constitution. In particular, it allowed parties outside
the Constitutional Assembly, such as the IFP and the Conservative Party, to
participate in the debate.
The Volkstaat Council, joined by the Conservative Party, argued that the
Constitutional Principle XXXIV established an expectation about the
creation of a Volkstaat among a significant number of Afrikaners which the
final Constitution did not realize. Nothing concrete was given in the form
of self-determination, and its achievement had been made much harder.28
Moreover, they claimed, the internationally recognized right to self-
determination, which included the right to secession, was made subject to
the discretion of Parliament.
The Constitutional Court showed little sympathy and held that "what-
ever subjective hopes any parties might have had as a result of the insertion
of Constitutional Principle XXXIV," it was a permissive rather than an obliga-
tory provision.24 The only mandatory aspect was that if a territory was estab-
lished in terms of the interim Constitution, it had to be entrenched in the
final Constitution. Because no such territory was established, no obliga-
tory entrenchment had to be made. All that the final Constitution had to
effect was that the door on the right to self-determination, opened by Con-
stitutional Principle XXXIV, was kept ajar. That was done by section 235.
The legal attack on the diminution of provincial powers, which the IFP
joined, was more successful. The Court held that the overall effect of the
Constitution was that there was a substantial diminution of provincial powers.
As a result, the Court refused to certify the Constitution. After a few minor
changes were effected by the Constitutional Assembly in September 1996,
the Constitutional Court certified the Constitution in December 1996 as
being in accordance with the Constitutional Principles.
Implementing the 1996 Constitution
When the 1996 Constitution came into operation on 4 February 1997,
the only unfinished "federal" business was, as far as the Freedom Front was
concerned, the implementation of the Commission for the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities.
At the first public conference of the commission, held in October 1996,
KCape Times, 5 August 1998.
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only the Freedom Front showed an interest in the institution. Church
leaders were indeed sceptical about the wisdom of churches participating
in a state institution. The Freedom Front, seeking to grasp the commission
as theirs, had to wait nearly two years before the first parliamentary debates
on the commission occurred in August 1998. When the debates did occur,
a vision different from theirs was advanced by the government. The then
deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, saw the role of the commission as a way
that South Africans could organize themselves to unite as a people around
common national aspirations and a common identity, while also honoring
and respecting their diversity.25 For the Freedom Front, however, hope
sprung eternal, and their spokesperson, Dr. Corne Mulder, argued that the
commission should not be a culture "talkshop" but must have the power to
ensure that laws were passed to safeguard communities' rights, chief among
which was the right to self-determination.26
The next step in the life of this institution was the appointment by the
Minister of Constitutional Development of Chris Nissen, the former ANC
leader in the Western Cape, to investigate the establishment of the
commission. Even if the commission might have a role to play in
safeguarding communities, the Volkstaat was not high on Nissen's agenda.
Far from visiting Orania, the only exclusive Afrikaner settlement on the
banks of the Orange River in the semi-desert of the Northern Cape, Nissen
was meeting with a San community, a people who have almost disappeared
from the face of South Africa, living in the same arid area of the Northern
Cape. By the end of 2000, there was not yet draft legislation on the table,
operationalizing the Commission.
In contrast to the marginal position into which the white right-wing
drifted, the IFP was brought onto center stage by the ANC. For the ANC,
the solution to the continuing violence between ANC and IFP supporters
in rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal was political, not constitutional. Ever since
the adoption of the final Constitution, there have been concerted efforts
by the ANC for political reconciliation with the IFP. There was even public
discussion of a merger of the two parties. Indeed, whenever both President
Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki were out of the country, none other
than the erstwhile fierce federalist Buthelezi was appointed acting president
on a number of occasions. It was under his eight-day acting presidency in
September 1998, and widi full support of the president and deputy president,
that South African armed forces (under the cover of the Southern African
Development Community's legitimacy) entered Lesotho to restore stability.
This political process of accommodation continues. After the second
democratic elections of June 1999, the constitutional mandate for a
government of national unity lapsed. Yet, despite the decreasing popular
the IFP lost its majority in the provincial legislature; in the 80 seat legislature the IFP with 34 seats formed
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support of die IFP,27 and in the absence of any prior election pact, President
Mbeki included, as in 1994, three IFP members (including Budielezi) in
his cabinet.
The more permanent legacy of die peacemaking efforts has been the
bolstering of the provincial system. The constitutional amendments of
March 1994 furdier entrenched provincial legislative powers, including the
power to draft provincial constitutions with legislative and executive
structures and procedures different from those in the national Constitution,
and increased taxing powers. Most important, the enactment of
Constitutional Principle XVIII ensured that powers and functions of die
provinces could not be substantially diminished in the final Constitution, a
principle which the Constitutional Court enforced by not certifying die
1996 Constitution the first time around.
Even the constitution-making power of the provinces has turned out to
be limited in scope. After the IFP's failed attempt at a provincial constitution,
it has only been the Western Cape legislature, governed by the National
Party, tiiat has utilized this power. The Western Cape relied on the provision
that a provincial constitution may provide for "legislative and executive
structures and procedures that differ from those provided for" in the
national Constitution when it sought to draft an electoral system different
from that in the national Constitution. The national Constitution provides
for proportional representation determined solely with reference to party
lists. In the draft Western Cape constitution, elections in die province would
be held in terms of provincial legislation which is "based predominantly on
the representation of geographic multi-member constituencies; and result
in general in proportional representation."
In refusing to certify that the provincial constitution is in conformity
with the national Constitution, the Constitutional Court shied away from
adopting a pro-provincial interpretation of the term "legislature structure"
and held that it referred to no more than the nature and the number of the
elements constituting a legislative structure, which excluded the manner
in which members are elected.28 After the Western Cape legislature deleted
the electoral provisions, the Court approved the amended provincial
constitution.
The provincial constitution has had at least one positive result for the
Western Cape thus far. A 42-member legislature is provided for by the
constitution, which is three more than the 39 members subsequently
prescribed by a national formula audiorized by the national Constitution.
The Constitutional Court upheld the provincial constitution in April 1999
as it was a true example of a "legislature structure" different from that
wln re: Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 1997 9 BCLR 1167 (CC).
29'Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v Electoral Commission 1999 (11) BCLR 1209 (CC).
3oRonald L. Watts, "Contemporary Views on Federalism," Evaluating Federal Systems, ed. Bertus de Villiers
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provided for by the national Constitution.29 The origins of this small victory
for provincial interests lie in the conflict-ridden days of March 1994 and
the constitutional efforts at peacemaking.
FEDERALISM AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS
Federal arrangements are often not static but are elements of a flexible
and dynamic political process. Ronald L. Watts has written that"[f]ederalism
is not an abstract ideological model to which political society is to be brought
into conformity, but rather a way or process of bringing people together through
practical arrangements intended to meet both the common and diverse
preferences of people."30 The South African experience of peacemaking
through federal arrangements exemplifies the notion of federalism as "a
way or process of bringing people together." It is a dynamic process that
reflects the exigencies of the time. As a way of bringing people together,
the "federal process" had a beginning but no clear end. The process
commenced with the promise of a federal option that could culminate in a
full-blown federal structure. It was the promise of a Volkstaat that brought
the right-wing Afrikaners into the political compact of the new South Africa.
A dynamic dimension to federalism is particularly pertinent where federal
solutions are central to a peacemaking process. The practical arrangements
developed in the process of peacemaking may be transitory in nature and
inappropriate when the immediacy of the conflict has subsided and
normalized political processes dominate. The strength of the 1993 South
African Constitution was that it institutionalized the element of process, of
ongoing constitution-making. The 1993 Constitution was to some degree a
peace pact, seeking to bring people together in a democratic South Africa.
It was labelled "interim" or "transitional" precisely because it was not the
product of a democratic political process, but was influenced to some degree
by the politics of power in its crudest form-the capacity and the will to use
violence. The key battle which the ANC won was to make the 1993
Constitution a peace pact and not a final political compact.31 However, the
very nature of peacemaking often involves giving long-term guarantees, and
this makes unlikely a watertight division between a peace pact and an
eventual political compact. The 1996 South African Constitution had to
comply with the broad framework set by 35 negotiated Constitutional
Principles, which included elements of the asymmetrical federal
peacemaking deals.
In the final Constitution, all the asymmetrical federal features
disappeared. It is trite to say that any federal process is without an inevitable
31Nico Steytler, "Constitution-making: In Search of a Democratic South Africa," Negotiating Justice: A
New Constitution for South Africa, eds. Mervyn Bennun and Malyn D.D. Newitt (Exeter: University of Exeter
Press, 1995), p. 62.
3JThe Freedom Front gained 0.8% of the vote (and three seats), (down from 2.1% and nine seats in
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logic or destination because its trajectory is influenced by many factors.
Reverses to the process of decentralization have much to do with the very
reasons that ignited it in the first place. Where conflict initiates the process
and peacemaking is the objective, the federal process is fed and kept on
course by the continued existence of the underlying conflict. Where the
conflict or the threat of conflict disappears, or the conflict is resolved
politically, the federal process may peter out.
This process is well illustrated by the demise of the Volkstaat initiative.
The collapse of the Afrikaner right-wing as a political force after the 1994
election was spectacular. The militancy of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
has been reduced to a whimper. The Conservative party returned to the
fold and contested the 1994-1995 local-government elections but fared
dismally. With no gains to show, the right-wing remained fractured and, in
the 1999 national election, gained a total of only four seats in Parliament.32
The ANC government secured control over the armed forces, and the threat
of armed insurrection is a thing of the past. As a language or cultural
community, those who call themselves Afrikaners are fractured across the
political spectrum.
Whether the federal process proceeds beyond the practical arrangements
that were occasioned by the initial conflict depends much on whether the
conflict was an articulation of the "federal qualities" of that society.33 Key
elements of these federal qualities are territory and political commitment
around some bonding interest, such as language, culture, or religion.
Watts has observed that federal political systems have been a response to
the need to accommodate territorially distributed concentrations of diversity
within a society.34 Although territory is not a sine qua non, and non-territorial
segmentation is possible, the latter is the exception rather than the rule. In
the case of the Volkstaat idea, the absence of an identifiable territory not
only meant that the promise of the interim Constitution could not be
realized, but it also dissipated political mobilization. As few federal
proponents were located in an identifiable territory, there has been little
enthusiasm among Afrikaners for a Volkstaat because it would entail, at best,
exchanging leafy urban suburbs of wealth for a barren patch of desert poverty
somewhere in the Northern Cape. Non-territorial segmentation is the only
other avenue left. However, the protection of collective cultural and
language rights in the Bill of Rights has to be on a non-racial basis, which
contradicts the real gravamen of white right-wing aspirations.
33See W. S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change, (1965), quoted in Ronald L. Watts,
"Federalism and Fragmented and Segmented Societies," Federalism and Civil Society, eds. Jutta Kramer and
Hans-Peter Schneider (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), p. 146.
MSee Watts, "Federalism and Fragmented and Segmented Societies," pp. 149-151.
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Even where there is a territory, the political will of its inhabitants must
be committed to self-rule. Although KwaZulu-Natal forms a historical and
geographical entity, the political will to mobilize around culture and
language under the umbrella of the IFP is lacking. First, there is no longer
a majority of "federalists" in the province. In the 1995 local-government
elections, the ANC captured most of the major cities and towns in the
province, and in the 1999 election, the IFP gained only 42.5 percent of the
provincial vote. Moreover, the alienation between the Zulu king and the
IFP has deprived the latter of a key symbol of Zulu nationalism. Second,
politically the IFP, and Buthelezi in particular, has been drawn onto the
center stage of the nation. If Buthelezi's ambition was the driving force
behind holding out for a fully fledged federal state during the negotiations
in 1993, as some commentators have suggested, then the real cause of the
conflict has been addressed. The ANC sensed that the solution of KwaZulu-
Natal conflict lay in political accommodation, not in the legal stratagems of
federal arrangements.
Although the South African case study suggests the transitoriness of
federal arrangements where they respond to the exigencies of the time,
one should keep in mind Watts'35 observation that institutionalizing a federal
process may provide a dynamic of its own, feeding into or nurturing
subnational interests. Although the immediate forces driving the federal
impulse have dissipated, others may emerge. The asymmetrical provisions
of the 1993 Constitution were recouched in symmetry; no group would get
special treatment. The institutionalization of the right to self-determination
in the 1996 Constitution may yet attract unforeseen adherents. Other
provinces may still find, and parade, their royalty. More important, however,
will be the development of the provinces. Whatever political ambivalence
the ANC may harbor about the role and function of the provinces, the
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